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Saturday, September 14, 2002
01:28 a.m.
UPI: "US as mad as hell and not taking it any more"
One generally looks to the main US news agencies for moderate, sometimes thoughtful, often stodgy comment pieces.
So when a piece like this from Martin Walker of UPI comes along, worthy of some of on of the more high-spirited of the warbloggers, one's interest is naturally aroused.
A NY Times poll published at the weekend found that better than 2:1, in answer to
"Which statement do you agree with more? Iraq presents such a clear danger to American interests that the United States needs to act now, even without the support of its allies, OR the U.S. needs to wait for its allies before taking any action against Iraq."
answered that the US should wait (Question 48).
But Mr Walker takes a rather less sympathetic view of the value of allies in particular, and the entire non-US world in general.
When he refers to
"the jeering response to America's first black secretary of state at last week's global summit in Johannesburg",
and
"the opinion pages of liberal European newspapers that should know better",
essentially he's seeking to discredit the sincerity and effectiveness of US allies by attributing to them by implication responsibility for things over which they can have no control.
(I gained the impression, by the way, viewing footage on the TV, that not a few of those jeering in Joburg were Americans. This report - from AP! - confirms the impression. A truly difficult ally might suggest, Keep your own guys in line before whinging to us....)
He's evidently piqued by bin Laden's characterisation of the US as an 'empire' as completely to lose all grasp of history:
"Empire is a bizarre term for the United States, which is led by a temporary elected president who is subject to the rule of law and the budgetary authority of Congress. It is hard to equate this with the classic empires of the past."
Both the UK and France, at the height of their imperial glory just before World War 1, were democracies with 'temporary' governments and as much of the rule of the law as the US of the period. (Or perhaps he's thinking of the Roman Empire. Would that be strictly relevant?)
His fantasy continues:
"The United States, with the temporary exceptions of the occupation forces in Japan and Germany after World War II, has not ruled others and shows little intention of doing so."
He has an absurdly limited notion of the nature of empire - even those of more recent centuries. Apart from the colonies subject to European settlement, British (and, I believe, French) rule was mostly indirect: formally so in most of Africa (the term associated with the colonial administrator Lord Lugard) and what it now Malaysia, effectively so in British India (where Europeans were outnumbered by Indians by around 1,000 to 1). (The Native and Princely States in India were effectively internally self-governing.)
The record of the US is equally variegated: areas for European settlement were available within the US itself, thanks to slaughter of the Indians and acquisitions (peaceful or otherwise) from France, Spain and Mexico (each new zone of occupation initially a sort of internal empire, similar to that long held by the Russians); what the US is pleased to call the 'Western Hemisphere' it brought within its sphere of influence under the Monroe Doctrine (a highly lucrative 'keep-out' agreement leaving the UK with economic hegemony over much of Latin America); actual occupation of territory south of the Rio Grande was spasmodic - the example of the Southern filibusters of the 1850s (seeking new lands to conquer on behalf of the Slavepower) was followed in a series of military adventures: the 1898 war against Spain, leading to lengthy occupations of Cuba and Philippines, and the annexation of the still-anomalous Puerto Rico; the occupation of Haiti in 1914 by that whited sepulchre of foreign affairs, Woodrow Wilson (and similar ventures in Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and elsewhere - this lists over 30 foreign interventions (of one size or another) by US forces between 1890 and 1914 alone).
As UK strength failed, the extent and depth of US control of Latin America increased - need one mention more than Guatemala 1954, Chile 1973, Grenada 1983.....
It would have been bizarre if a power like the US had not chosen to try to mould its neighbours to its will: that it did not have viceroys in white-plumed hats riding in carriages in Havana or Managua is beside the point - the imperial substance was there. No reason for American touchiness.
He then proceeds from history to current affairs. He mentions a
"conference earlier this year at Ditchley, a stately country house in Britain's Oxfordshire countryside. Winston Churchill took refuge there on moonlit nights during World War II, lest German bombers target his official country residence at Chequers."
The old bulldog showing a yellow streak, skulking away from the enemy!
He continues:
"They all don black ties for a splendid dinner in a stately hall on Saturday nights, before gathering around the piano in song. In such convivial ways is the British conception of the "Special Relationship" studiously tended...."
The stuffy old Brits, left-over extras from some old Masterpiece Theatre production, nursing their fond illusions about Uncle Sam. (Of course, there's no such thing, and the stuffiest British shirt has known it from the start - just about when we were stiffed (to use the mot du jour) by the American Loan in 1945. It's a useful lie - a piece of good manners, equivalent to an errant spouse avoiding confronting his (or her) helpmeet with proof of infidelity.)
Apparently, in this very Brideshead location,
"senior Bush administration officials had a blunt message to deliver. The European allies (the British excepted) were not pulling their weight in the alliance."
Well, at least all that toadying has earned Tony some brownie points! Though to say
"Britain scrapes a passing grade with a whisker under 3 percent [of GDP spent on defence]"
seems rather to snatch most of those points back. (Though why
"a whisker under 3 percent"
should be a scrape pass when the American paragon (no doubt, an A grade student) spends only
"3.4 percent"
is something of a mystery.)
Stranger still is that paradox that, having railed at the Europeans for slouching on defence, the Bush guys (apparently) whinge that
"members of the European Union were playing a dangerous game by courting a new European Union Rapid Reaction Force".
And why?
"The Americans suspected that the Europeans were downgrading NATO...."
Frankly, to suppose that the RRF will be 'reacting' any time soon is vastly to overestimate the military resources of the nations concerned and their ability to coordinate political wills sufficiently to use them. (The German army - still half conscript - is something of a joke, and the French is not in great shape.) To suggest EU defence UDI, however qualified, is to set up a straw-man: not terribly impressive.
But, supposedly, the US contingent were giving the straw-man houseroom:
"The Europeans, whose waspish comments about Texan cowboys and unilateralism and Israel had not passed unnoticed in Washington, had to show that these suspicions [ie, of defence UDI] were misplaced."
So sensitive! And who exactly does he mean by 'Europeans'? European governments in official statements? Or journos on
"liberal European newspapers that should know better"?
European pols have certainly waxed lyrical about Kyoto and the ICC - but is the land of the First Amendment suggesting that allies can't criticise one another? And, as for Israel - it notoriously takes no notice of any European government: don't the Bushies realise that?
But - finally - we get to the crunch:
"Conveniently, a litmus test was at hand: the determination of the Bush administration to take its War on Terrorism to Iraq. If the Europeans played the supportive role expected of allies, fine. If not, Washington would draw the proper conclusions about NATO's future."
'My way or the highway.' Has a certain Texan twang to it.
He suggests, by way of magnanimous concession, that
"From a French, and often from a wider European viewpoint, the Americans seemed to be steadily abandoning their traditional loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance..."
But that's not, I think, what the Europeans genuinely think, if by 'Atlantic Alliance' he means 'NATO': the strategic importance of Western Europe to the defence of the continental US hasn't changed in the last 15 years, it's just that the latest major threat to the integrity of the region has been eliminated. US participation in NATO is business, not charity. If he means something wider, then that was always pretty much window-dressing. Rows over trade abound; as do out-of-area foreign policy differences (eg over Iran).
After all this backstairs gossip from Churchill's funk-hole, Mr Walker gives us an off-the-record quote from a 'senior U.S. diplomat':
"When the Europeans demand some sort of veto over American actions, or want us to subordinate our national interest to a UN mandate, they forget that we do not think their track record is too good...."
When have 'Europeans' demanded a 'veto over American actions'? 'Veto' implies a power to prevent something happening - in what circumstance would 'the Europeans' have such a power over the US? It also implies a degree of unity of thought which rarely if ever exists, even amongst the main military powers in the EU.
If all he means is that, sometimes, a European government makes suggestions to its ally about courses of action - then 'veto' is a very loose and misleading way of describing it. Worrying from one in a profession where the precise use of words is so important.
And what 'UN mandate' could he be referring to? Not, surely, in relation to Iraq, where the Administration is itself to seek UN cover for military action. Evidently, no conflict with 'national interest' there, then.
Then he rants about supposed European foreign policy errors of judgement:
"The Europeans told us they could win the Balkans wars all on their own. Wrong."
Did Europeans ever pretend they could 'win' any war in the Balkans? In any case, Europeans would scarcely have been impressed with the effectiveness of recent US efforts: the debacle in Somalia; not to mention the failed intervention in Lebanon (1982-4).
"They told us 20 years ago that détente was the way to deal with what we foolishly called the Evil Empire."
If he's saying that US policy to the USSR in the Reagan era was universally hostile, that's plainly untrue. For example, though candidate Reagan had derided Carter's Salt II treaty, President Reagan voluntarily agreed to hold to its terms, even though it wasn't binding on him (because it wasn't ratified).
And Reagan quite warmed to Gorbachev after their tête-à-tête at Reykjavik in 1986 and agreed the INF Treaty in 1987 to eliminate medium-range nuclear missiles.
"They complain about our Farm Bill when they are the world's biggest subsidizers of their agriculture. The Europeans are not just wrong; they are also hypocrites."
Now, here's the thing: I'd guess that a handy majority of the political class in the EU (which - technical note - is not 'Europe', of course) would be delighted to get rid of the CAP. But they can't in a blue moon, because of - politics.
It works all over, as anyone beyond the age of believing in Santa Claus well knows: for instance, Bush waxing lyrical about free trade:
"When trade advances, there's no question but the fact that poverty retreats."
And then slapping tariffs on lumber and steel.
Is that hypocrisy? Or politics?
"They are wrong on Kyoto, wrong on Arafat, wrong on Iraq -- so why should we take seriously a single word they say?"
Kyoto, I would give him. On the other two, it's profound scepticism about means, rather than differences on ends, that separates the Administration from most of its EU allies.
And cut the hubris, eh? Neither the US nor its allies exactly have a perfect record when it comes to foreign policy judgement.
France contrived to fight two unwinnable colonial wars and put its democracy on the line; and there was Suez; and the Falklands; and a whole bunch of post-war European snafus.
But, let's not forget, when Eisenhower was willing to send in the USAF to help the French in Dien Bien Phu, he was stopped by two things: Congressional leaders (including one Lyndon Johnson) told him (meeting of April 3 1954) that they would not sanction the US going it alone; and Britain flatly refused to go along with the maniacal plan.
And let's never stop repeating the word 'Vietnam': with all the history of French failure - and the narrow squeak in 1954, the true dementia of pretty much the entire US foreign affairs establishment - stuffed to the gunnels with learning and military experience - in allowing itself to bring the US into a war it was never in any serious danger of winning.
The way they misled themselves and the American nation in committing to the war is well documented - now. But, at the time, they and their abilities were pretty much trusted implicitly by the public and the media.
Johnson and his men spoke with every bit as much confidence about the need to keep those dominoes from falling as Bush does of the threat posed by Saddam; when Landslide Lyndon said, on October 21 1964 (nearly three months after the Tonkin Gulf Incidents, when the deception got underway in earnest):
"We are not about to send American boys 9 or 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves"
he was, of course, lying through his teeth.
Is there any reason to suppose that Landslide George is any more truthful - or competent?
Then Mr Walker forecasts that
"....the Arab world is in for an even deeper shock."
He highlights two 'errors' of policy which will be corrected:
"The United States has spent 30 years trying to play by what we might call European rules, seeking to play the role of honest broker between Arabs and Israelis."
So Uncle Ariel is going to get carte blanche? Not what Bush said at the UN:
"America stands committed to an independent and democratic Palestine, living side by side with Israel in peace and security."
And
"America has watched while the Saudi "allies" use their petro-dollars to buy off internal dissent against their indefensibly sexist and undemocratic feudal regime by exporting their intolerant and puritan Wahabist creed throughout the Islamic world."
And I hear that the Pope is actually Catholic. Who knew?
"There is a post 9-11 mood in Washington to ask why, with the kind of American resolve and wisdom that turned the World War II enemies of Japan and West Germany into peaceful and prosperous democracies, an Iraq liberated from Saddam Hussein, or a Palestinian state liberated from the corrupt incompetence of the Arafat gang, or an Afghanistan liberated from the Taliban, might not enjoy a similar transformation."
Naturally, Washington only has to
'ask why'
for everything to turn out just as it wishes. With a sprinkling of fairy-dust and a lot of clapping hard, of course.
It seems that George is going to get his war, allies or no allies. However, in pondering the outcome, he may care to ponder the words of his hero Winston Churchill: of a daughter repenting an unwise marriage, he said
"She did what she liked; now, she must like what she did."
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