The Lincoln Plawg

Thursday, November 7, 2002 01:15 a.m.

US strategy defects - by a War supporter

I've mentioned before the paper by Anthony Cordesman assessing Iraqi warfighting capabilities and the likely course of the impending war. This seems to be the only extensive analysis available online.

Cordesman has followed up with a shorter, discursive paper on US strategy in general, and on the Iraq question in particular. The paper is described as a rough draft and is certainly less polished than his earlier effort. It does, however, identify a number of weaknesses which could impact on the conduct of an Iraq war (as well as a number of longer term problems).

There's no point in précis-ing a reasonably short paper (25 pages) and crisply written (for a think-tank). Suffice it to say that the problems he identifies in terms of (to take some examples)

equipment (targeting of air attacks, interoperability with allies (including Britain), deficiences in the defence of US forces against WMD attack);
diplomacy and PR (in the Arab world, in particular - where perceived US inaction on the Israel/Palestine conflict bulks large);
wild cards, in particular the Israeli response to a WMD attack of any size from Iraq;
the risk of Iraqis resorting to urban warfare (their only viable military tactic to avoid annihilation);
nation-building in a post-Saddam Iraq,

whilst not novel, are still largely unaddressed by the Adminstration.

Interestingly, Cordesman writes from the perspective of a reluctant supporter of the conquest of Iraq. He took part in a panel discussion organised by the Middle East Policy Council on October 9.

He starts off his contributions with

.....personally and with great reluctance I would say that we probably do have to fight this war.

And he is as far from gung ho as it's possible to get and still support the war. He is deeply uncomplimentary about the Perle Tendency:

there is no room here for adventures, the use of special forces, air power to the exclusion of land power, innovative new concepts from people in the Defense Policy Council, well meaning civilians, military retreads or for that matter civilian analysts.

And he finishes his first contribution with the following:

If we do not deal with debt reparations and contracts, if it is not clear that there is a moral and ethical goal to this war that serve's Iraq's needs and not our own, and we are not prepared to act on that from the day we go in, in terms of peacemaking, humanitarian relief and other activities, all of the other issues are moot. Our military victory will be a grand strategic defeat.

I somehow feel that he has little more faith than I have (which is not much!) in the competence and inclination of the Adminstration to do what he says is required.

(The MEPC discussion, though rambling - as transcripts tend to be - nevertheless contains some goodness: on the false analogy between post-Saddam Iraq and the post-War occupations of Germany and Japan, for instance; and the possibility of Kurdish strife (and Turkish intervention) over Kirkuk. And the tone, if not anti-war, is nevertheless rational - there's a reference to

neo-conservatives and neo-crazies

that I took to be referring to the same guys.....)