Totalitarianism Today
ALINA STEFANESCU
ALINAON@MSN.COM
Wednesday, October 9, 2002
JULIAN SANCHEZ TAKES ON RAMESH PONNURU
I'll let Julian do the talking, since his eloquence makes eubonics of my attempts at communication.
"As some of you already know, and others are about to find out, Will Wilkinson and I will be squaring off for a bout of rhetorical fisticuffs against National Review's Ramesh Ponnuru and AFF's Justin Torres this coming Wednesday. The topic is cloning & genetic technologies, and as you might surmise, Will and I are all in favor of ushering in a Brave New World as quickly as possible. Or at any rate, not raising too many regulatory barriers to one. Our opponents believe genetic technologies to be socially disruptive, morally repugnant, and generally fairly icky. Whatever your view on the matter, provided that it's the same as ours, Mr. Wilkinson & myself would love to see any/all of you there.
The event will take place at the Fund for American Studies (1706 New Hampshire Ave. NW). Drinks will begin at 7:00 p.m., with dinner and discussion following at 7:30. Please RSVP to matthew@americasfuture.org."
Wednesday, October 9, 2002
COGNITIVISM, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND CONSCIOUSNESS
Joanne breathes conscientiousness into an excellent debate on artificial intelligence in her post for Monday, October 7th. Inspired to retrieve her dropped ball, with her permission (I hope), I did a little homework. Drawing on an article in the latest issue of Harper's Magazine, Joanne phrases the problem as follows:
"The problem is, humans can ultimatly accuse ALife of simulating their emotions. No one can read another's mind, so how can empathy exist with two different beings -- one made of non-living material?"
Ullman's article ends by propagating her particular answer to the ever-hot question still plaguing modern philosophy of mind, namely: What is consciousness? This question breaks down into a small army of separate questions, the most crucial and fundamental of which attempt to establish either
A]the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for which a body might be said to possess "consciousness" or
B]the particular qualities of consciousness itself (i.e. sentience, awareness, memory, etc.)
Ullman wants to claim that a conscious creature (whether a cow or fembot) is distinguished by its ability to recognize its fellow creatures, or brothers-in-consciousness. Casting her net a bit too widely, Ullman risks including more than seems fitting, given her earlier anthopomorphism. For example, while this might eliminate computers or robots from the definition of consciousness, the entire animal kingdom finds itself included.
The water gets more difficult to tread as more people hop in. Enter the Director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, Daniel Dennett is one of the most controversial and fascinating philosophers of mind overseeing current the overlap of philosophy of mind, computer science, and cognitive science. His "frame problem" continues to haunt undergraduate philosophy students around the world. So what he thinks about the problem of animal consciousness might be helpful.
In a paper entitled, "Do Animals Have Beliefs?", Dennett describes his "cognitivist approach" and how it maps onto the particular questions posed by animals for the understanding of consciousness. Unlike "behaviorists", who ignore or deny the existence of mental states (such as beliefs and desires) and mental processes (such as imagination and reasoning), cognitivists "take the mind seriously, and develop theories, models, explanations, that invoke, as real items, these internal, mental, goings-on".
Whereas behaviorists concentrate exclusively on external, publicly observable behavior, and the (external, publicly observable) conditions under which such behavior might be elicited, cognitivists move beyond Pavlovian reflex to probe the inner states of consciousness more deeply on the assumption that people "and at least some other animals" have minds which make them rational agents.
"Like behaviorists, cognitivists believe that the purely physical brain controls all behavior, without any help from poltergeists or egos or souls, so what does this supposedly big difference come to? When you ask a behaviorist what the mind is, the behaviorist retorts: "What mind?"--and when you ask a cognitivist, the reply is; "The mind is the brain." Since both agree that it is the brain that does all the work, their disagreement looks at the outset to be merely terminological. When, if ever, is it right, or just perspicuous, to describe an animal's brain processes as thinking, deciding, remembering, imagining? This question suggests to some that the behaviorists may have been right about lower animals--perhaps about pigeons and rats, and certainly about frogs and snails; these simple brains are capable of nothing that should be dignified as properly "cognitive". Well then, where do we "draw the line" and why?"
So what do AI fans envision for the future of human-kind? In his book, Flesh and Machines, Rod Brooks, the director of the MIT AI Lab and Co-founder, Chairman, and CTO of iRobot Corporation, argues that human nature can be seen to possess the essential characteristics of a machine. Our instinctive rejection of that idea, he believes, is itself a conditioned response: we have programmed ourselves to believe in our “tribal specialness” as proof of our uniqueness.
Tuesday, October 8, 2002
HAVEL RETIRES FROM HIS FUGUE
Czech President Vaclav Havel gave this speech in New York on September 19, 2002, at the Graduate Center of the City University, on the occasion of his last official trip to the United States as President of the Czech Republic. A little bit sad, a little bit sombre, but typical of a philosopher king, Havel says at one point:
"I am saying only this: to set out on the path of reason, peace, and justice means a lot of hard work, self-denial, patience, knowledge, a calm overview, a willingness to risk misunderstanding. At the same time, it means that everyone ought to be able to judge his or her own capacity and act accordingly, expecting either that one's strength will grow with the new tasks one sets oneself or that it will run out. In other words, there is no more relying on fairy tales and fairy-tale heroes. There is no more relying on the accidents of history that lift poets into places where empires and military alliances are brought down. The warning voices of poets must be carefully listened to and taken very seriously, perhaps even more seriously than the voices of bankers or stock brokers. But at the same time, we cannot expect that the world—in the hands of poets—will suddenly be transformed into a poem.
Be that as it may, there is one thing I know for certain: that regardless of how I played the role allotted to me, and regardless of whether I wanted it in the first place, or deserved it, and regardless of how much or how little I am satisfied with my efforts, I understand my presidency as having been a magnificent gift of destiny. After all, I have had the opportunity to take part in truly world-changing historical events. And that—as an experience of life and a creative opportunity—has been worth all the traps that lay hidden within it."
Tuesday, October 8, 2002
RECONCILING RANDIANISM WITH SUPPORT OF ISRAEL
Today at 6:30 PM, Dr. Yaron Brook, president and director of the Ayn Rand Institute, will be speaking at Harvard Law School on "The Moral Case for Supporting Israel".
According to the HLS events page:
The Interdenominational Alliance for Israel will be kicking off our speaker series on Tuesday October 8th at 6:30 p.m. in Langdell North. Join us for a discussion on "The Moral Case for Supporting Israel," featuring the president and director of the Ayn Rand Institute, Dr. Yaron Brook. Also be on the look out for other speakers coming to campus, including Shaykh Abdul Hadi Palazzi, Secretary General of the Italian Muslim Association, an Imam of the Italian Islamic Community, and Director of the Community's Cultural Institute
Dr. Brook has been interviewed extensively by the print, radio and television media for the Objectivist position on current events, including the Middle East conflict, terrorism, environmentalism, animal "rights," the energy crisis, and religion. Among his recent interviews have been appearances on Talk Back Live (CNN), Your World with Neil Cavuto (Fox News Channel), The O'Reilly Factor (Fox News Channel) and Alan Keyes Is Making Sense (MSNBC).
He has published in academic as well as popular publications, taught and lectured extensively in the United States and abroad on issues related to the Middle East conflict, terrorism and American foreign policy, finance and ethics, international finance, banking and corporate governance.
Tuesday, October 8, 2002
THE IRONY OF EVIL AND RACISM
Martin A. Lee thinks September 11th should have helped to focus attention on the oft-ignored ties between Islamic terrorism and Neo-nazi extremism. This comes as no surprise to The Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union, who have maintained newsletters on this association for some time now. Bernard Honnigfort remarks on how this plays out in the day-to-day life of Germany. A UN press release includes both groups in its condemnation of present religious and ethnic intolerance around the world.
Tuesday, October 8, 2002
THE EXPANDING WAIST-LINE OF BUSH'S AXIS
Despite the "democracy" brought by the US to the former Yugoslavia during its 1999 bombing of Kosovo, it looks like nationalism wins at the ballot box in Serbia. Maybe we should bomb them again. For emphasis. At least we can be comforted with the knowledge that the Bush will add Serbia as a new member of his "axis of evil" during his next golf-cart speech.
Tuesday, October 8, 2002
ARMCHAIR WARRIORS OFTEN FAIL, WE'VE BEEN POSIONED BY THESE FAIRY TALES
Scouring the news, I stumbled across what could only be called the perfect afternoon activity for everybody's favorite yuppie pundit, the Vodkapundit. He could invite a few friends over for beer and Aristocrat and then settle down to get the full experience of fighting the war on terrorism by playing a video game-- best for the kinds of warriors that like the action without incurring the risk. There is nothing more honorable than a man who struts his war fervor from the safe confines of a computer screen or a plush armchair.
Tuesday, October 8, 2002
IS BUSH A WILSONIAN?
Cornell University Historian Walter Lafeber makes a strong argument for thinking so in a recent article for the Post. Why might a Wilsonian cowboy-style foreign policy prove destructive under current conditions? To begin with, as Lafeber notes:
"Wilsonianism, more than any other -ism, has shaped the
foreign policy thinking of Americans in the early 21st century.
Articulated in Wilson's 1917 speech asking Congress to
declare war, it rejects neutrality in an age where the conduct of
"civilized states" was at issue.
Wilsonianism has been glorified, especially since the American
triumph in the Cold War. But it is less a policy than a disorder.
That is because at its core, Wilsonianism has a split
personality. One Wilson preached the ideal of worldwide
democracy and free enterprise under the aegis of the League of
Nations. The other Wilson was the greatest unilateral military
interventionist in U.S. history."
Indeed, Wilson sent troops into countries as diverse as Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, casting doubt on his dedication to principles of "national self-determination". Lafeber is correct to be skeptical about the use of excessively idealistic phraseology in foreign policy discussions, as it distracts policy-makers from considering the difference (and increasing distance) between the ideal pursued and the often-repulsive means used to pursue this ideal. (Indeed, I would argue that part of the current foreign policy conundrum stems from the tension between various US foreign policy goals, like the spread of free markets and democracy, and the means chosen to pursue these goals, many of which are anti-democratic and highly militaristic.) Lafeber criticizes the "Wilsonian dual personality problem" of US foreign policy, writing:
"In moments of crisis since 1945, the United States has usually
tried to resolve its Wilsonian dual-personality problem by
using force. As anti-invasion voices are now discovering to
their sorrow, unilateralism is as American as Thomas Jefferson
(who warned against "entangling alliances") and Woodrow
Wilson. If Wilson himself and the recent U.S. past are any
guides, and they are, the problem of American dual
personalities will once again result in the application of U.S.
might. This force will be largely unilateral in its composition
and sent on its way by a decision that is totally unilateral. And
it will be used, we'll be told, to realize a Wilsonian world of
democracy and free enterprise, starting in this case with
Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The Wilsonian dual personalities will
live on, as will their continual struggle, for the Bush Doctrine is
indeed open-ended, regardless of any specific congressional
authorization. The doctrine will call for a continual war
required to "lead the world" to continual peace. And being
Wilsonians, most Americans will believe it."
Although Lafeber is generally better known for his Cold War history, his expertise extends to historical accounts of shifts in US foreign policy as well.
Lafeber's views on the Monroe Doctrine might be fleshed into his critique of Bush's overly-promiscuous policy of military intervention. Suffice it to say that the cool, rational approach to combining promiscuity with a license to kill left the scene with Sean Connery's James Bond. Strikingly pitiful at the fine art of finesse, Bush cannot even play it safe with pretzels, so how can we trust him with nuclear weapons? Or an expansionist ideal-cum-raison d'etat, for that matter?
Tuesday, October 8, 2002
WHY ARE THE COMMONS STILL SO TRAGICALLY HIP?
Richard D. Parker, the HLS professor known for his Norman Rockwell-tapered populist-conservatism, argues that "mixing commons-as-politics with commons-as-policy-making dilutes the potency of the rhetoric and so diminishes a common resource…part, even, of our commons".
For an interesting close-up, peruse Cato scholar Tom Palmer's reply.